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WHEN THE CURTAIN MUST BE DRAWN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH 
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING INFORMATION 
THAT, FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY, CANNOT BE DISCLOSED. 
by Peter L. STRAUSS1, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia Law 
School, USA. 
 
If we are to protect our civil rights and civil liberties against [today’s terrorist] 
threats, the aggressive use of informants, surveillance, wiretaps, searches, inter-
rogations, and even group-based profiling must be measured not only against 
the liberties these practices constrict, but also with respect to the liberties they 
may protect. ... It is simply not sufficient to say that augmenting [our usual law 
enforcement] practices with laws and practices more appropriate to 
counterterrorism is necessarily inconsistent with protecting our civil rights and 
civil liberties.2 
 
peaking about counter-terrorism in France today is a fraught 
subject, given the recent awful events that so dramatically 
illustrated the tensions between our precious liberties, and the 
steps that might be required to protect them. The impact of 
terrorism on liberty is, however, my subject. The Twenty-first 
Century’s wars against terror, like the Red Scare and Cold War of 
the Twentieth, have repeatedly put pressure on procedural values 
ordinarily observed in American adjudications. In criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceedings, tribunals may be faced with the 
government’s wish to rely on evidence that, for reasons of national 
security, cannot be disclosed to the private parties concerned in the 
matter. There may even be circumstances in which the government 
is unwilling to reveal to the tribunal itself information about the 
source of a fact proposition it wishes to assert – for example, the 
identity of a secret agent who has provided it or the manner in 
which an intercepted communication has been obtained. Similarly, 
the government may wish to resist a private demand for 
information, that ordinarily it would be obliged to supply, because 
it is a state secret – and, again, it may be unwilling to disclose the 
information even to the tribunal alone, as might be thought 
necessary to permit assessing the accuracy of its claim. 
In American law, which emphasizes adversarial processes in 
adjudication, the importance of confrontation (the delivery of 
testimony in the presence of the party against whose interest it is 
presented) and cross-examination (rigorous questioning by a 
                                                
1 Many thanks to colleagues David Pozen and Matthew Waxman for helping me find my 
way across somewhat unfamiliar ground. Any straying from the path, however, is my 
responsibility alone. 
2 Philip Bobbitt, TERROR AND CONSENT – THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
245-46 (2009). 
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party’s attorney of witnesses for the opposing side, once they have 
presented their testimony) arms resistance to the use of secret 
evidence and supports claims for its disclosure. In criminal 
prosecutions, the rights “to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense” are secured by 
the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and place the 
government’s wishes in shadow. In civil and administrative cases, 
similar but less explicit counter-pressure arises from one’s Fifth 
Amendment right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without “Due Process of law,” a phrase whose meaning derives 
much from the American commitment to adversarial adjudication.3 
When a person’s life, liberty or property has been or might be negatively affected 
by government action, the process that is due is to be determined by a difficult 
comparison among the private interest affected, government interests (in 
efficiency, expedition, national security, etc.), the risk of error created by the 
procedures actually afforded, and the prospect of reducing that risk by supplying 
additional procedures.4  
The claims to confrontation and cross-examination are overcome 
in a variety of situations in which statements made or records kept 
out of court are thought to be reliable – as, for example, records 
kept in the ordinary course of business rather than created for this 
particular dispute; or a witness made unavailable by death or 
departure who has made statements in circumstances suggesting 
their credibility. Direct confrontation may be thought unacceptably 
harmful, psychologically, to a minor child or an abused spouse. In 
these circumstances, however, the person whose interests are at 
risk will have viewed the records and been able to question the 
person presenting them; she will know the identity of the witness 
and the statements she is reported to have given. But in the context 
of national security, circumstances may suggest that disclosing 
either or both to the person at risk – even disclosing the fact of or 
reasons for action – would in itself produce an unacceptable 
chance of harm. 
These issues achieved prominence in American jurisprudence in 
the wake of World War II, when the development of nuclear 
weapons, our Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the 
demagoguery of Joseph McCarthy combined to create high stakes 
in the possession of military information and an atmosphere of 
suspicion and fear. Writing this paper brought home that it was in 
this crucible that my own engagement with administrative law 
began – in college, through independent study of the Atomic 
                                                
3 Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“An opportunity to meet and rebut 
evidence utilized by an administrative agency has long been regarded as a primary 
requisite of due process.”) 
4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”) 
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Energy Commission’s security clearance hearings for J Robert 
Oppenheimer; and, in law school, by an extensive seminar paper 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Greene v. MacElroy.5 In both 
these settings, the latter especially, matters known only to the 
tribunal, involving reliance on damaging statements by persons 
neither the tribunal nor the subject of their proceedings ever met, 
were the driving force producing an adverse decision.  
In Greene, an “indispensable” aeronautical engineer and important 
executive officer for a naval contractor had been stripped of his 
security clearance, and had for that reason been essentially 
disqualified from pursuing his profession. This action had been 
sustained after repeated hearings, reversals, and high-level 
reconsiderations within the security clearance bureaucracy; what 
was in the public record revealed it to be, evidently, a case on the 
margin; and it occurred at the height of the McCarthy era. Greene, 
his attorney, and supporting witnesses attended those hearings, but 
the government did not present witnesses. The tribunals, which 
minutely questioned Greene and his witnesses, evidently relied for 
its adverse findings on written reports Greene and his attorney 
were not permitted to examine.6 The tribunals’ questioning did appear 
in the record available to reviewing courts, and the case eventually reached the 
United States Supreme Court. The extensive footnotes in Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion for that Court make clear how much of the information 
adverse to Greene came from the written reports of unidentified investigators 
about “information … from an informant characterized to be of known 
reliability,”7 reports screened and evaluated for the Board by unidentified 
“security advisers,” “well-trained people who know how to evaluate reports and 
evaluate information.”8 The actual holding of the case was that authorization 
for a program run in this manner must be express, and that express 
authorization for it was missing; but that holding was driven by constitutional 
doubts about the permissibility of such departures from American commitments 
to confrontation and cross-examination in proceedings gravely affecting an 
individual, and the language expressing those doubts has often been quoted and 
relied upon in subsequent opinions: 
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our 
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action 
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action 
depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the 
Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he 
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important 
in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important 
where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose 
                                                
5 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
6 “The transcript to be made of this hearing will not include all material in the file of the 
case, in that, it will not include reports of investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation or other investigative agencies which are confidential. Neither will it 
contain information concerning the identity of confidential informants or information 
which will reveal the source of confidential evidence. The transcript will contain only the 
Statement of Reasons, your answer thereto and the testimony actually taken at this 
hearing.” Id. at 486. 
7 Id. at 486 n. 16. 
8 Id at 499 n. 27. 
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memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or 
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, 
or jealousy.9  
 Similar issues recently confronted the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the intermediate 
federal court having the greatest influence over the development 
of American administrative law.10 The Ralls Corporation, an 
American corporation owned by two Chinese nationals associated 
with a Chinese maker of wind turbines (Sany), purchased four 
companies with established legal rights to construct wind farms at 
sites in and around an area of militarily restricted air space; under 
state law this established Ralls’ right to build the wind farms, which 
it characterized as a commercial opportunity to demonstrate the 
quality of its turbines. Other foreign-owned firms with foreign-
made wind turbines already operate wind farms in the same area. 
Ralls negotiated with the Navy a relocation of its one site that 
actually lay within the restricted space, to reduce airspace conflicts. 
As required by the Defense Production Act of 1950,11 it filed a 25-
page notice with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) detailing its plans and its reasons for 
believing they posed no security threat to the United States. CFIUS 
is a high-level executive agency chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, responsible to review foreign investments that “result in 
foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce”12 
for possible effects on national security; if unable to negotiate 
mitigation of any such effects as it finds, it submits a report to the 
President detailing its findings and their basis, and he must act on 
the report within fifteen days, suspending or prohibiting a 
transaction he finds to present such a threat.13 His actions and 
findings “shall not be subject to judicial review.”14 During its 
review, CFIUS asked several questions of Ralls, and entertained a 
presentation by it, but CFIUS provided Ralls and its attorneys no 
access to such information as it possessed from other sources. 
CFIUS then submitted an (undisclosed) recommendation to the 
President, who promptly found that the Ralls windfarm project 
created a security threat. He therefore issued orders effectively 
barring both Ralls and any items made by Sany from the four sites. 
“[N]either CFIUS or the President gave Ralls notice of the 
evidence on which they respectively relied nor an opportunity to 
rebut that evidence.”15  
The case presented a number of knotty questions that might have, 
                                                
9 Id at 495. A Lexis search 12/27/2015 returned 60 federal and 36 state court quotations 
of this passage, most notably in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970), the well-known 
catalyst of America’s “due process explosion,” and 376 citations to the page on which it 
appears. 
10 Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
11 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170. 
12 Id. § 2170 (a) (3). 
13 Id. § 2170 (d). This report is not shared with its subject. 
14 Ibid. 
15 758 F. 3d at 306 
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but did not, prevent the court from addressing Ralls’ constitutional 
claims to know and have the opportunity to respond to any 
information adverse to its interests. Just as constitutional doubts 
about the security clearance procedure’s reliance on undisclosed, 
unconfronted evidence had led the Greene Court to demand the 
explicit authorization it found to be lacking for that procedure, due 
process concerns led the Ralls court to demand more than a 
“broadly worded statutory bar” to foreclose judicial review of 
constitutional claims.16 Although the court agreed with the 
government that review of national security determinations on 
their merits would be inappropriate for courts,17 it found that 
resolving Ralls’ claim to certain procedural rights would not 
necessitate judicial review of those substantive conclusions. The 
balancing inquiry to determine the requirements of due process, in 
circumstances in which process is constitutionally “due,” has been 
stable for almost 40 years.18 The court easily found that the 
President’s order had deprived Ralls of relationships recognized as 
“property” under state law, the necessary precondition of Ralls’ 
constitutional claim.19 What, then, were the minimal procedures 
having to be employed? Ralls had received neither notice of any of 
the information on the basis of which the CFIUS and the President 
acted (and thus no opportunity to challenge or respond to it) nor 
any explanation of its reasoning in finding a security threat. And 
the government conceded that the record included unclassified 
information as well as information the government was obliged to 
protect for reasons of national security. Invoking both Greene and 
recent opinions dealing with the designation of organizations as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs),20 the court concluded 
that Ralls was entitled to notice of the unclassified information 
being considered by the CFIUS, and an opportunity to rebut it.  
In Greene, the Court had not had to decide whether, in security 
clearance hearings, security-sensitive material must be revealed to 
a person whose life could be strongly affected by reliance on it. It 
was enough to require reversal that reliance on secret information 
had not explicitly been authorized by President or Congress. But 
                                                
16 At 309 ff. 
17 The foundational Supreme Court case for this proposition is Department of the Navy v. 
Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). A laborer at a nuclear submarine facility was denied a security 
clearance necessary to permanent accession to his position, and therefore discharged. The 
Navy gave him full notice of the grounds for this denial, none of which involved sensitive 
government information (he had criminal records and a past drinking problem, and had 
not fully disclosed these matters – thinking them long since behind him – on his 
application) and an opportunity to respond and to appeal administratively. The issue for 
the Supreme Court was not the adequacy of these procedures, but whether first Civil 
Service authorities and then the courts could review the substantive merit of the Navy’s 
conclusion to deny him security clearance. It was in relation to this issue, not the adequacy 
of the Navy’s procedures, that the Court observed, at 530, “unless Congress has 
specifically provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude on the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.”  
18 Mathews v. Eldredge, n. above. 
19 That an alternative course of action for Ralls would have been to seek CFIUS clearance 
before making its purchases was not, the court concluded, a course the DPA required it to 
follow. 
20 National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir.. 2001) [NCRI]; 
People’s Mujahedin Org. Of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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the FTO cases had reached that issue, as the Ralls court remarked: 
we made clear – and we iterate today – that due process does not 
require disclosure of classified information supporting official 
action. See NCRI (classified information “is within the privilege and 
prerogative of the executive, and we do not intend to compel a 
breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect”). 
We have consistently followed NCRI in subsequent FTO cases...21  
Thus, whatever classified information the government might have 
had and relied on in stripping Ralls of its $6 million investment, 
Ralls was not entitled to the amenity engineer Greene had in fact 
enjoyed in Greene v. McElroy, to know what its allegations were. 
The court did not require that Ralls be informed even of the general 
gist of the secret information being relied upon, the opportunity 
Greene had enjoyed, with an opportunity to respond to that 
description.  
Ralls in this way reflects an increased judicial willingness to privilege 
government claims of secrecy, even if not quite so complete a 
willingness as the government seeks. It is only one such reflection. 
Designation as an Foreign Terrorist Organization is another 
context in which these issues have arisen. Such designations are the 
current equivalent of the Cold War/McCarthy era “Communist 
Front organization.”  Identification as a CFO was in fact less 
portentious; it brought community disrepute to the organization 
and obloquy to its members, but had few formal effects beyond 
providing evidence useful in security clearance determinations. For 
FTOs, by contrast, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA],22 designation has major legal 
consequences; it results in a criminal-law-enforced blocking of any funds the 
organization may have on deposit with any financial institution in the United 
States, and it establishes as a major felony “knowingly providing material 
support or resources” to the organization.23 The Supreme Court has found that 
even humanitarian (other than medical or religious) support would permissibly 
violate this statute.24  
CFOs had much more open a chance to challenge their designation 
then than do FTOs today. During the Cold War, the protests of 
the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee against its designation as 
a Communist Front organization engendered in the Supreme 
Court an opinion by Justice Frankfurter that later was credibly 
characterized as “the finest exposition of the need for a hearing”:25 
[Designation as] “communist” by the Attorney General of the 
United States … imposes no legal sanction on these organizations 
other than that it serves as evidence in ridding the Government of 
persons reasonably suspected of disloyalty. It would be blindness, 
however, not to recognize that in the conditions of our time such 
                                                
21 758 F.3d at 319. 
22 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
23 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a). 
24 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2010). 
25 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1277 (1975). Judge 
Friendly succeeded Learned Hand as the United States Court of Appeals judge academics 
generally regarded as the finest in the country. 
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designation drastically restricts the organizations, if it does not 
proscribe them. Potential members, contributors or beneficiaries 
of listed organizations may well be influenced by use of the 
designation, for instance, as ground for rejection of applications 
for commissions in the armed forces or for permits for meetings 
in the auditoriums of public housing projects. Yet, designation has 
been made without notice, without disclosure of any reasons 
justifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosed evidence 
or suspicion on which designation may have been based, and 
without opportunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and 
acts of the organization are innocent…  
… From a great mass of cases, running the full gamut of control 
over property and liberty, there emerges the principle that statutes 
should be interpreted, if explicit language does not preclude, so as 
to observe due process in its basic meaning… The heart of the 
matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights 
of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government 
must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained 
by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights… 
… [This principle] should be particularly heeded at times of 
agitation and anxiety, when fear and suspicion impregnate the air 
we breathe. “The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is 
abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the 
malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to 
play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.” United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (dissenting) 
… 
Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete 
immunity from outward responsibility in depriving others of their 
rights. At least such is the conviction underlying our Bill of 
Rights… No better instrument has been devised for arriving at 
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the 
case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way 
been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular 
government, that justice has been done.26 
As later in Greene, however, the decisive issue in that case was 
legislative authorization.  
In the AEDPA, Congress created a much more limited procedure 
for designation of FTO status. Three months before the 
September 11 attack, which understandably reinforced awareness 
of terrorist threats and the need to find them in advance of action, 
the D.C. Circuit described it this way:  
The unique feature of this statutory procedure is the dearth of 
procedural participation and protection afforded the designated 
entity. At no point in the proceedings establishing the 
administrative record is the alleged terrorist organization afforded 
notice of the materials used against it, or a right to comment on 
such materials or the developing administrative record. Nothing in 
                                                
26 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 160-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
concurring). 
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the statute forbids the use of “third hand accounts, press stories, 
material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the 
organization’s activities. The Secretary may base the findings on 
classified material, to which the organization has no access at any 
point during or after the proceeding to designate it as terrorist.  
… [Within] thirty days after the publication of the designation in 
the Federal Register, [a designated organization may obtain judicial 
review] … based solely upon the administrative record … [U]nder 
the AEDPA the aggrieved party has had no opportunity to either 
add to or comment on the contents of that administrative record; 
and the record can, and in our experience generally does, 
encompass “classified information used in making the 
designation,” as to which the alleged terrorist organization never 
has any access, and which the statute expressly provides the 
government may submit to the court ex parte and in camera.27 
The court indicated that it had indeed reviewed the classified information in the 
record supplied to it. As would the Ralls court subsequently, it found a 
due process violation in the government’s failures to provide notice 
of the pending possible designation as an FTO and the unclassified 
information it had, with an opportunity to appear and present its 
side of the story.28 Nothing in the court’s opinion, however, suggested the 
slightest obligation to provide the kind of information revealed in the Greene 
record and demanded by Justice Frankfurter, apprising the 
organization of the gist of the classified, secret information on which 
the government might rely.  
The constitutional right to confrontation and national security 
secrecy collide most dramatically in criminal prosecutions. Here 
again developments have been characterized by strong beginnings, 
congressional action, and judicial retreat. Cold War spy 
prosecutions brought Ivanov v. United States to the Court in 1967, 
embedded in what appears to have been an organized crime 
prosecution, Alderman v. United States.29 At issue was the possibility 
that wiretap evidence not supported by a search warrant, and thus illegal, had 
led the government to evidence used in prosecuting Ivanov for espionage. 
Governing law required a court to exclude from evidence not only material 
unlawfully seized (which unlawfully overheard conversations would be30) but 
also any “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The government strenuously argued that 
this question should be explored in camera and ex parte by the trial judge, 
                                                
27 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196-97. 
28 The court provided as an example of “notice” with which it would be satisfied 
We are considering designating you as a foreign terrorist organization, and in addition to 
classified information, we will be using the following summarized administrative record. 
You have the right to come forward with any other evidence you may have that you are 
not a foreign terrorist organization… 
The notice must include the action sought, but need not disclose the classified 
information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the statute. This is 
within the privilege and prerogative of the executive, and we do not intend to compel a 
breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect. However, the Secretary 
has shown no reason not to offer the designated entities notice of the administrative 
record which will in any event be filed publicly, at the very latest at the time of the court’s 
review. 
Id. at 208-209. 
29 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-374 (1967).  
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to avoid disclosing sensitive information unrelated to the 
prosecution. The brilliant oral advocacy of Edward Bennett 
Williams, a preeminent litigator of the time, persuaded Justice 
White, for the majority, otherwise. Mirroring Williams’ argument, 
he wrote: 
Admittedly, there may be much learned from an electronic 
surveillance which ultimately contributes nothing to probative 
evidence. But winnowing this material from those items which 
might have made a substantial contribution to the case against a 
petitioner is a task which should not be entrusted wholly to the 
court in the first instance. It might be otherwise if the trial judge 
had only to place the transcript or other record of the surveillance 
alongside the record evidence and compare the two for textual or 
substantive similarities. Even that assignment would be difficult 
enough for the trial judge to perform unaided. But a good deal 
more is involved. An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, 
a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, the 
identity of a caller or the individual on the other end of a telephone, 
or even the manner of speaking or using words may have special 
significance to one who knows the more intimate facts of an 
accused’s life. And yet that information may be wholly colorless 
and devoid of meaning to one less well acquainted with all relevant 
circumstances. Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in 
our view the task is too complex, and the margin for error too 
great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court to 
identify those records which might have contributed to the 
Government’s case.  
… It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the 
Government to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national 
security or third-party interests. But this is a choice the 
Government concededly faces with respect to material which it has 
obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge would find, 
is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the defendant.31  
And the same choice, even more emphatically, would face the 
government if it wished to introduce testimony by a secret 
informant, or from an otherwise admissible document that it was 
unwilling for reasons of national security to share with the 
defendant, or if the defendant wished to call as a witness a person 
who would properly be asked to testify on national security 
matters. Steps short of giving up the prosecution might be possible 
– for example, having the witness testify in such a way that her 
identity would be known only to the defendant, counsel, and 
court,32 or entering a protective order. Accommodations such as 
                                                
31 394 U.S. at 182-84. 
32 T.S. Ellis, III, The National Security Trials: A Judge’s Perspective, 99 VA. L. REV. 1607, 1612-
13 (2013) ([For one suppression hearing,] the following procedure was devised, designed 
to accommodate both Lindh’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right and the 
government’s interest in preserving the secret identity of any covert government 
employee whose testimony might be required at the hearing. First, any such witness 
would enter the courtroom by way of the prisoner’s elevator, which is both separate from 
the elevators used by the public, and not visible to the public. The witness would then 
walk to the witness stand, staying always behind a curtain that concealed the witness from 
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this – even ex parte revelations to a court in the course of 
determining the need for them – could not be totally secure, with 
the result that, even so, the government might conclude that it 
should choose the alternative of foregoing prosecution. For 
knowledgeable defense attorneys in cases likely involving such 
information, there grew up a practice of “greymail,” calling 
witnesses or seeking documents – sometimes late in the course of 
proceedings – that would create this dilemma for the prosecution. 
Congress, driven by its increasing fear of terrorism, subsequently 
created procedures intended to protect the secrecy of government 
surveillance and to counter “greymail.” The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act [FISA],33 first enacted in 1978, was comprehensively 
amended in 2008. In its initial form, it created a special court, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, whose basic operations were secret. Sitting 
federal judges named to it by the Chief Justice of the United States were 
authorized to issue surveillance warrants that would be secret, and obtained on 
the basis of state secret information, but that would in many respects resemble 
search warrants ordinarily obtained: a specific foreign target must be named, 
with probable cause shown to believe it a foreign power or its agent, and the 
government was required to identify the nature and location of each facility or 
place to be bugged. In addition the government was required in each instance to 
describe procedures that would be used to minimize the intrusion on the privacy 
of Americans – those protected by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement. Some combination of the September 11 attacks and its sequellae, 
and the uncovering of massive warrantless National Security Agency 
surveillance activities being conducted outside this framework on the claimed 
inherent constitutional authority of the President, produced the 2008 
amendments. While still oriented to surveillance of the communications of non-
US persons located abroad, the prior elements of specificity have been 
withdrawn; submissions to a FISC judge no longer must describe specific targets 
or facilities; targets need not be a foreign power or its agent; there need only be 
shown that “a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign 
intelligence information”; and minimization procedures need only be addressed 
generally, not case-by-case. This legislative loosening of constraint answers the 
kinds of questions courts have previously asked, and the same fears/reactions 
to national threat as prompted its enactment may underlie a recent Supreme 
Court decision making it appear that its constitutionality is unlikely soon to be 
adjudged by the courts.34 
 The “greymail” issue was addressed in another act, the Classified 
Information Procedures Act of 1980.35  
CIPA’s purpose is straightforward. The statute establishes 
procedures meant to protect the government from graymail by 
balancing the executive branch’s need to protect classified 
                                                
the view of those seated in the gallery of the courtroom. This curtain also prevented the 
witness from being seen by anyone in the gallery throughout his or her testimony. Lindh 
and his counsel, however, would be seated in the jury box, directly across from the 
witness, and would therefore be able to observe the witness throughout the testimony. 
The witness would then testify using a pseudonym and an electronic voice distortion 
device.)  
33 50 U.S.C. ch. 36 § 1801 et seq 
34 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (U.S. 2013) 
35 18 U.S.C. App. 3. 
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information against a criminal defendant’s rights. It does so in two 
ways. First, defendants must declare early in the proceedings the 
“price” [he or she] asserts the government will have to pay if the 
prosecution continues. CIPA operationalizes this function by 
imposing notice requirements on defendants intending to submit 
classified information as evidence36 and requiring pre-trial hearings 
to determine relevance and admissibility.37 That lets prosecutors 
calculate ex ante whether the possible national security costs of 
prosecution are worth its benefits. Second, it authorizes judges to 
modify discoverable material38 and admissible evidence39 in order 
to minimize the disclosure of classified information--through the 
use of unclassified summaries and protective orders, for example-
-while at the same time vindicating the constitutional and statutory 
rights of criminal defendants.40  
The 1980 Congress, that is, accepted the likely consequence that the government 
could be put to its choice, and did not attempt to privilege security 
information over confrontation rights; but it worked to curb the 
use of this possibility as a litigating weapon. It was a compromise 
measure, enacted after considerable legislative struggle and 
grudgingly accepted by the civil rights and defense community; and 
its implementation by courts has tended to respect the balance 
struck. “As its opponents recognized, CIPA is, at its core, a pro-
government statute. By diminishing defendants’ ability to graymail, 
it removes an arrow from the defense team’s quiver. A prosecution 
is a zero-sum game, and one party’s loss is the other’s gain. 
However, in removing an arrow, CIPA’s procedural framework 
grants the defendant a partial, patchwork shield against arbitrary or 
unfounded prosecutorial secrecy claims. Where it favors the 
government’s interest in secrecy, it provides judges a number of 
ways to vindicate defendants’ equally important trial rights.”41 
Those ways, it might be remarked, include a not unfamiliar model 
– albeit the one Edward Bennett Williams persuaded the Court to 
reject in Alderman – in which the tribunal reviews sensitive 
material ex parte, with government assistance, to determine how 
much if any of it will be important to the defendant’s case, and 
                                                
36 App. 3 § 5 
37 Id. § 2. 
38 §§ 3-4. 
39 §§ 5-8. 
40 Ian MacDougall, Note: CIPA Creep: The Classified Information Procedures Act and its Drift 
into Civil National Security Litigation, 45 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 668, 678 (2014) 
[CIPA Creep]. This excellent student Note contains a much fuller description of the Act’s 
provisions and implementation. 
41 Id. At 682-83. Six years ago, a colleague’s comparative analysis demonstrated that in 
other common-law, adversary-process oriented legal systems having their own needs to 
deal with terrorism and national security (Canada, Israel and the United Kingdom), 
procedures not unlike CIPA were in place in the context of criminal law and associated 
possibilities of preventive detention. Daphne Barak-Erez and Matthew C. Waxman, Secret 
Evidence and the Due Process of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L.3 (2009). 
Those affected were entitled to know the gist of the security information that would not 
be directly revealed to them, which might be supplemented either by judicial examination 
of the withheld material to determine, inter alia, the sufficiency of the gist provided, or 
by the appointment of a second counsel with clearance to see the withheld material who 
might then be able to argue on the affected person’s behalf (but, of course, without 
disclosing to him or his regular counsel what that material was).  
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whether the defendant’s needs can be satisfied by government 
concession of matters that might be at issue, or by the provision of 
an unclassified summary of the gist of the classified material. In 
Alderman, recall, the Court had reasoned  
An apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to 
what appears to be a neutral person or event, the identity of a caller 
or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the 
manner of speaking or using words may have special significance 
to one who knows the more intimate facts of an accused’s life.42  
But the corresponding argument can be made, and has been made, 
in the opposite direction – in support of the CIPA procedures and 
the government interests they protect. 
[M] uch of the government’s security interest in the conversation 
lies not so much in the contents of the conversations, as in the 
time, place, and nature of the government’s ability to intercept the 
conversations at all. Things that did not make sense to the District 
Judge would make all too much sense to a foreign counter-
intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation’s 
intelligence-gathering capabilities from what these documents 
revealed about sources and methods. Implicit in the whole concept 
of an informant-type privilege is the necessity that information-
gathering agencies protect from compromise “intelligence sources 
and methods.” … [These] concerns inform our construction of 
CIPA and the classified information privilege, and the same 
concerns must inform analyses by district courts in passing on the 
discoverability of classified information.43  
Defendants’ access, that is, may depend on their capacity to 
establish the materiality of the information they seek to their 
defense, without knowing precisely what it is. 
Yet in the context of the criminal procedures to which it directly 
applies, it seems possible that interpretation of CIPA’s procedures 
will be influenced in defendants’ favor by the requirements of the 
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. A 2004 opinion of the 
Supreme Court, Crawford v. Washington,44 emphasized the 
necessary connection between the right to confrontation and the 
opportunity for cross-examination in relation to out-of-court 
statements obtained to prove a criminal case. Historically, “the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was 
the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused 
… [T]he Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial 
statements unless [the declarant] was unavailable to testify, and the 
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”45 
Subsequent decisions have focused on the nature of a “testimonial 
statement.”46 Thus, in consolidated cases, the transcript of a 
                                                
42 TAN above. 
43 United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
44 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
45 At 50, 53-54. 
46 Defined in Crawford as [1] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — 
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; [2] extrajudicial statements … 
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telephone call made in the midst of an emergency was admissible 
despite an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the person 
who had made it,, because the call was made to secure a response 
to the emergency; but the results of police questioning after 
responding to a different emergency were not, because made to 
obtain proof of the prior event.47 Most recently, in Williams v. 
Illinois,48 the Court failed to agree on a majority opinion in a case 
challenging one expert’s testimony that reasoned from another 
expert’s report of test results. For a plurality, it was enough to 
permit the testimony that the other expert’s report was formally 
offered to prove only the fact, not the veracity, of it; four Justices 
were prepared to narrow to “testimonial” only statements “having 
the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging 
in criminal conduct,”49 and the absent expert’s report did not. 
Justice Thomas, whose vote was necessary for the result upholding 
the conviction being challenged, thought this primary purpose test 
lacked “any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in 
logic,”50 and found the use of the report proper because it was not 
a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”51 Four dissenters thought use 
of the absent expert’s report would inevitably be taken to support 
the truth of the testifying expert’s testimony; “the fact finder can 
do nothing with it except assess its truth,” and it must thus be 
recognized as testimonial, requiring confrontation.52 Government 
offers of secret evidence, even if they do not satisfy the plurality’s 
“primary purpose” test, often will likely satisfy Justice Thomas and 
the Williams dissenters as “testimonial” – undercutting the 
possibility that the CIPA procedures could be interpreted to permit 
its introduction to establish guilt.53  
Outside the context of criminal procedure, any claims to confront 
witnesses and to know the evidence that may be used to a person’s 
disadvantage rest exclusively in the Due Process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus on language whose 
imprecision and governing interpretation54 belies an irreducible 
                                                
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions; [and] [3] statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial. 
At 51-52 
47 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (the transcript) decided together with Hammon 
v. Indiana (the subsequent questioning). A not dissimilar distinction had earlier had to be 
drawn in a case challenging separate searches of a site where arson was suspected; a 
contemporaneous search, possibly related to continuing danger, did not require a warrant, 
but a return to the scene “clearly detached from the initial exigency and warrantless 
entry”– with obvious criminal enforcement purpose – did. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 399 
(1976). 
48  132 S.Ct. 2221 (2012). 
49 At 2242-43. 
50 At 2273. 
51 At 2259. 
52 At 2269. 
53 Cf. United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988 (5th Cir. Tex. 2013); an excellent student 
Note, Jessica K. Weigel, Hearsay and Confrontation Issues Post-Crawford: The Changing Course 
of Terrorism Trials, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1488, explores these issues in some detail. 
54 Text at n. above. 
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right. As against Congress’ plenary right to exclude non-citizens at 
the nation’s borders and provide for the expulsion of others 
unlawfully present, “due process” has offered little security against 
the government’s use of information known only to it in 
proceedings leading to exclusion or deportation. Despite citizens’ 
right to travel, the issuance and validity of passports was for 
decades controlled by the State Department on the basis of an 
unexplained conclusion that international travel “would be 
contrary to the best interests of the United States,” and without 
recourse;55 only in 1958, in Kent v. Dulles,56 did the Supreme Court 
find the withholding of a passport unlawful; and here, as in Greene 
and Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee, its precise ground of 
decision was want of explicit legislative authorization for 
constitutionally questionable actions – not ratification of the 
procedural rights claimed. 
In the civil action context, too, the government is able to claim a 
“state secret” privilege to resist disclosure of information that 
might be valuable to a plaintiff in litigation pursuing an affirmative 
claim. Here the foundation was laid by United States v. Reynolds,57 
another case with Cold War overtones, in which the widows of 
civilian observers killed when an Air Force plane caught fire and 
crashed were denied discovery of the Air Force’s official accident 
report in connection with their suit for damages under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act.. The issue, however, was not resolved simply by 
the executive’s claim of privilege. Plaintiffs’ need for the document 
had also to be considered. 
Regardless of how it is articulated, some … formula of 
compromise must be applied here. Judicial control over the 
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may 
automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before the 
claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible 
to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that 
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the 
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the 
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon 
an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in 
chambers.58  
In Reynolds, the government had offered to permit surviving crew 
members to testify about the cause of the crash, which appeared 
unlikely to involve the experimental electronics present on the 
                                                
55 This history and its bearing on contemporary disputes about “no-fly” lists are 
compellingly told in Jeffrey Kahn, Mrs.. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel and Terrorist Watch 
Lists (2013). 
56 357 U.S. 116. 
57 345 U.S. 1 (1953), reaffirmed in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), another case seeking an 
award against the government (enforcement of an alleged contract in relation to 
espionage), not fair procedure in a government action depriving a person of life, liberty 
or property. 
58 At 9-10. 
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plane. This offered compromise weakened any claim that having 
the report was necessary for the widows’ case, and the action was 
not dismissed but remanded so that it might go forward on that 
basis. Seemingly important, too, was that the case arose under a 
statute that had, to some degree, waived sovereign immunity; that 
such a waiver of absolute government freedom from financial 
liability extended to revealing military secrets could be doubted.  
Respondents have cited us to those cases in the criminal field, 
where it has been held that the Government can invoke its 
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go 
free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the 
Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see 
that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake 
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive 
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. 
Such rationale has no application in a civil forum where the 
Government is not the moving party, but is a defendant only on 
terms to which it has consented.59 
Where the government relies on state secrets to deprive an 
individual of liberty or property, the action that gives right to a 
claim to due process in doing so, access to that information is not 
simply an aid to securing affirmative relief. Thus, it would seem the 
same contrast with the Reynolds circumstances could be drawn. 
And the case for making that distinction is not weakened by the 
realization that when, finally, the Air Force report at issue in 
Reynolds was declassified, the claim to “state secret” privilege 
appeared to have been hollow, suggesting a judgment influenced 
by litigation advantage rather than genuine national security need.60 
In recent years, however, the “state secret” privilege has been used 
with some frequency wholly to deny the possibility of suit, and in 
cases for which government consent is not a requisite. Consider, 
for example, El-Masri v. United States,61 an action against 
government officials in their individual capacity seeking damages 
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics62 for violations of El-Masri’s constitutional 
rights. These violations were allegedly effected by and under the 
direction of CIA agents, during brutal interrogations after his 
“extraordinary rendition.” The government intervened in this 
otherwise private action, asserting in sealed documents El-Masri 
and his counsel were not permitted to see, that the law suit could 
not go forward without exposing state secrets. Although the facts 
of extraordinary renditions and the brutal interrogation tactics they 
often entailed were, in general, well known, the government 
persuaded the Fourth Circuit that the particulars of El-Masri’s case 
could not be explored at trial without revealing matters entitled to 
the state secret privilege.  
                                                
59 At 12. 
60 Herring v. United States, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004); S. Rep. 
110-442, State Secrets Protection Act 5 (2008). 
61 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). 
62 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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[P] roof of the involvement -- or lack thereof -- of particular CIA 
officers in a given operation would provide significant information 
on how the CIA makes its personnel assignments. Similar concerns 
would attach to evidence produced in defense of the corporate 
defendants and their unnamed employees … [V]irtually any 
conceivable response to El-Masri’s allegations would disclose 
privileged information…  
In this matter, the reasons for the United States’ claim of the state 
secrets privilege and its motion to dismiss were explained largely in 
the Classified Declaration, which sets forth in detail the nature of 
the information that the Executive seeks to protect and explains 
why its disclosure would be detrimental to national security. We 
have reviewed the Classified Declaration, as did the district court, 
and the extensive information it contains is crucial to our decision 
in this matter… It is no doubt frustrating to El-Masri that many of 
the specific reasons for the dismissal of his Complaint are 
classified. An inherent feature of the state secrets privilege, 
however, is that the party against whom it is asserted will often not 
be privy to the information that the Executive seeks to protect… 
As we have observed in the past, the successful interposition of the 
state secrets privilege imposes a heavy burden on the party against 
whom the privilege is asserted… That party loses access to 
evidence that he needs to prosecute his action and, if privileged 
state secrets are sufficiently central to the matter, may lose his cause 
of action altogether. Moreover, a plaintiff suffers this reversal not 
through any fault of his own, but because his personal interest in 
pursuing his civil claim is subordinated to the collective interest in 
national security… 
… [W]e recognize the gravity of our conclusion that El-Masri must 
be denied a judicial forum for his Complaint, and reiterate our past 
observations that dismissal on state secrets grounds is appropriate 
only in a narrow category of disputes… Nonetheless, we think it 
plain that the matter before us falls squarely within that narrow 
class, and we are unable to find merit in El-Masri’s assertion to the 
contrary.63  
The court considered and rejected the possibility that its ruling 
effectively put in the executive’s hands a tool for avoiding 
embarrassment and liability – as appeared may have been the case 
in Reynolds, when the document whose secrecy was so important 
to protect was finally declassified.64 Courts are responsible to 
consider carefully the government’s case for invoking the privilege, 
the court remarked, and any possibilities of partial relief from its 
effects. Of course they do so in camera and ex parte, and thus 
without the participation of the individual whose interests may be 
defeated by the claim.65 And, as has been remarked, they may not 
                                                
63 At 310, 312-13. 
64 Herring, n. above. 
65 Daniel Capra, Introducing The Philip D. Reed Lecture Series: Panel Discussion: the State Secrets 
Privilege and Access to Justice: What Is the Proper Balance?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (2011):  
“A court’s determination that a piece of evidence is a privileged state secret removes it 
from the proceedings entirely…  
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do so only in reliance on objective factors – that the executive has 
a greater capacity to understand the stakes, and that the 
government interest in national security is a paramount claim. They 
are human, and may be “afraid. They are afraid of terrorism. They 
are afraid of what could happen to our security if they rein in 
government.”66  
Scholars have found that courts have required in camera inspection 
of allegedly privileged documents in fewer than one-third of the 
reported cases in which the privilege has been invoked, and that 
this proportion is declining.67 As a result, “even though the 
Reynolds case held that ‘judicial control over the evidence in a case 
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,’ the 
practical effect of the decision [has been] to cause precisely that 
result.”68 When courts fail to scrutinize assertions of the privilege, 
they leave open the possibility that the privilege will be used to 
cover up Government wrongdoing, thereby denying justice to 
litigants and giving the executive branch the ability to violate 
statutes and constitutional rights with impunity.69 
One important difference between the current day and Cold War 
times has been the development of the Information Age, with its 
extraordinary capacities for surveillance, record-keeping and data-
mining. Since the 9/11 attacks, these capacities have been drawn 
upon extensively. There now exists a Terrorist Screening Center 
                                                
One of the problems of administering the state secrets privilege is that arguments must 
be made about it and about the sensitivity of information and the risk of disclosure and 
the like, without access to the information itself. So there are difficult questions that need 
to be answered about how a court goes about evaluating a claim of state secrets.”  
66 Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the Post-9/11 World, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1419-20 (2014). 
67 William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. 
Q. 85, 101 (2005). 
68 Id. 
69 S. Rep. No. 110-442, State Secrets Protection Act 5 (2008). The bill to which this Report 
related, S. 2533, was reintroduced in both Houses of Congress at the beginning of the 
Obama Administration, but died in committee in both. In 2009, the Department of 
Justice promulgated guidelines promising tighter control over the invocation of state 
secrets and, in particular, that “The Department will not defend an invocation of the 
privilege in order to: (i) conceal violations of the law, inefficiency, or administrative error; 
(ii) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency of the United States 
government; (iii) restrain competition; or (iv) prevent or delay the release of information 
the release of which would not reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to 
national security.” The Attorney General, Memorandum for Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components, 
Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege 1 (C) 
(September 23, 2009), available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/09/23/state-secret-
privileges.pdf. 
A subsequent statement by the Attorney General may illustrate another side of “violate 
statutes and constitutional rights with impunity.” In: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investi-
gation-interrogation-certain-detainees, he announced the closure of an “extraordinarily 
thorough” criminal investigation into the death of two individuals held in US custody 
abroad – perhaps the product of unauthorized interrogation techniques used by CIA 
interrogators – “because the admissible evidence would not be sufficient to obtain and 
sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied) That is, the 
government had decided not to pursue possible criminal responsibility for even the most 
reprehensible of the interrogation techniques its agents employed, for want of admissible 
evidence. The statement does not say so directly, but it is not hard to imagine “state 
secrets” considerations as the basis for judgments about admissibility. 
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[TSC] to make coordinated judgments whether a “reasonable 
suspicion” exists that an “identifiable individual”70 is associated in 
some way with terrorist activities, an enormous Terrorist Screening 
Data Base [TSDB]71 it administers as a coordinated data base for 
holding this information, and a considerable variety of government 
lists into which that data can then be fed as seems appropriate. The 
No-Fly List, administered by the Transportation Security 
Administration [TSA] to prevent identified persons from flying in 
American air space, is only one of these lists. A person may first 
become aware of her possible presence on the No-Fly List when 
she attempts to board a flight, domestic or international, for which 
she had successfully purchased a ticket and checked in; and that 
discovery may be attended with interrogations and other police 
actions. Subsequently, she can submit information to the 
Department of Homeland Security through its web site, in an effort 
to persuade it a mistake has been made. However, these procedures 
will not directly tell her whether she is on the list, provide any 
information about or characterization of the data that has 
produced any such designation, or permit her any human contact 
or hearing, however informal. Her submissions will be processed 
by the TSA and TSC behind closed doors. Eventually she may 
receive a letter that, without admitting she was ever on the list, will 
state formulaically that “after review of any applicable records … 
[if] it was determined that a correction to records was warranted, 
these records were modified… This determination constitutes our 
final agency decision, which is reviewable by the United States 
Court of Appeals.” Just what the determination was, or on what it 
was based, is not stated; the administrative record is provided to 
the reviewing court under seal for its review, ex parte and in camera.72 
As with FTO determinations and as in Ralls, litigation has begun 
somewhat to domesticate these procedures, albeit cautiously, and 
against concerted government resistance. Three district court 
actions, each of which defeated strenuous government efforts to 
preclude judicial review altogether, advance similar analyses of the 
due process implications of the no-fly list procedure.73 The 
                                                
70 As by name or name fragment and birthdate. The collection of this data on one’s 
purchase of a ticket for air carriage thus facilitates administration of the list. 
71 “Since its inception, the TSDB has grown by more than 700%, from about 158,000 
records in June 2004 to over 1.1 million records in May 2009. In 2007, these records 
contained information on approximately 400,000 individuals. As of 2007, the TSDB was 
increasing at a rate of 20,000 records per month. TSC makes 400 to 1200 changes to the 
TSDB every day. It is the ‘world’s most comprehensive and widely shared database of 
terrorist identities.’" Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 989-900 (9th Cir. Cal. 
2012). 
72 This paragraph draws heavily on Kahn, n. above. The quoted material appears in a 
letter reproduced at p 193. In Mohamed v. Holder in the Fourth Circuit, Kahn relates, 
“the Justice Department filed the index [to the administrative record as well as the record 
itself] under seal, preventing even a bare description of its contents.” At p. 315, n. 180. 
73 Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520 (E.D. Va. 2014); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180433 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012), on 
remand from 669 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2012); Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-750, 969 F. 
Supp. 2d 1293 (2013), on remand from Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. Or., 
2012). Judge Brown, the U.S. District judge considering Latif, has recently considered at 
least two other no-fly list challenges. Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (D. Or. 2014); 
Fikre v. FBI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73174 (D. Or. 2014). 
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government need not notify individuals in advance that they have 
been placed on the TSDB or, more specifically, the no-fly list – a 
form of notice that could readily compromise anti-terrorism 
efforts. But once that has become apparent (as by denial of 
boarding, unusual interrogations, etc.) and the individual has 
sought relief, it must provide a statement of reasons in as much 
detail as considerations of national security will permit, access to 
any unclassified information used in making the determination, an 
opportunity to submit evidence, and an unclassified explanation, to 
the extent possible, of any resulting decision with negative 
consequences, to facilitate participation in judicial review. On 
judicial review, the court considers the whole administrative 
record, ex parte and in camera to the extent security considerations 
so require. 
It is striking to notice how significantly these emerging procedures 
resemble those Congress has created for settings in which the 
personal claim for access to government information is much 
weaker. Under the Freedom of Information Act, persons denied 
information on the basis of one of its nine exemptions may 
challenge that denial in court, but they and their counsel (if they 
have one) will have no access to it. Instead they may receive what 
is known as a Vaughn Index, an attested document drawn up by 
the government, whose purpose is to describe the basis for the 
claimed exemption in sufficient detail to permit the reviewing court 
to decide whether the government has sustained its burden to 
prove the validity of the exemption claim, but not in so much detail 
as to reveal the information for which the exemption is claimed. 
Alternatively, the court or federal magistrate considering the review 
will examine the document in camera, ex parte, to determine the 
validity of the claim. In cases in which the Act’s first exemption, 
for state secrets, is invoked, the reviewing court is to decide 
whether documents are 
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an 
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense 
or foreign policy and 
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order  
Almost invariably, these determinations are made in camera; and 
while the second criterion invites independent judicial judgment, 
they are made with a high degree of deference to classifiers’ 
determinations. As the Ralls court remarked, in a context in which 
outsiders had a greater claim of access,74 “[C]lassified information 
‘is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive, and we do 
not intend to compel a breach in the security which that branch is 
charged to protect.’”75 
In one administrative setting where classified information might 
often have to be used in relation to desired government licenses, a 
similar approach is also taken, but with greater ostensible effort to 
                                                
74 FOIA claimants need have no reason other than curiosity for seeking information in 
the government’s hands; Ralls’ was being deprived of valualble property. 
75 Ralls, invoking NCRI, n. above. 
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minimize the use of that information and to maximize party access 
to or understanding of it. The procedures of the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission have long contained a special part 
to govern the use of classified information in its public 
procedures.76 Like CIPA, they lean against unnecessary use of 
classified material in hearings. Parties are to avoid its use unless 
necessary,77 on advance notice78 which includes “an unclassified 
statement setting forth the information in the classified matter as 
accurately and completely as possible,” which the presiding officer 
is instructed to prefer as the evidence of record to the extent 
possible;79 classified information is to be admitted only if its 
“relevance and materiality … are clearly established; and [its] 
exclusion … would prejudice the interests of a party or the public 
interest.”80 And any such evidence that may have been admitted is 
to be expunged from the record unless doing so would “prejudice 
the interests of a party or the public interest.”81 Hearings are 
ordinarily to be scheduled to permit the securing of necessary 
security clearances,82 and where they cannot be obtained, hearing 
officers are instructed to “tak[e] into consideration any lack of 
opportunity to rebut or impeach the evidence.”83 
When claims to “due process” have been validated in a civilian 
terrorism context, use of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,84 as 
in Ralls, has regularly recognized the strength of the private claim. 
The risk of error, and potential of additional procedures to reduce 
it, are also plaintiff-favoring, given the blank wall and simple “trust 
us” claims plaintiffs otherwise face. The government side of the 
balance, however, framed as its interest in national survival, has 
constrained the courts that are willing to find process due, to 
require less than Cold War plaintiffs learned, and either CIPA or 
the established administrative procedures provide. The terrorist 
threat, on analogy to ongoing criminal investigations, the seizure 
of dangerous foodstuffs, or other emergencies, requires no 
procedure whatever before the deprivation (refusal of boarding; 
immediately effective notice of an obligation to undo a transaction 
and remove property associated with it; etc.) has been effected. 
Post-deprivation, plaintiffs must receive some explanation of the 
grounds for the deprivation; access to any unclassified information 
in the record; and some opportunity to provide contrary/rebuttal 
information and argument. However, no court has yet required an 
unclassified account of state secret material in the administrative 
record (such as Greene effectively received through the 
questioning of him) or the kinds of advance procedures 
characteristic of CIPA and the established administrative process 
                                                
76 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart I, 10 C.F.R. 2.900-2.913. 
77 10 C.F.R. 2.906. 
78 10 C.F.R. 2.907-08. 
79 10 C.F.R. 2.910. 
80 10 C.F.R. 2.911. 
81 10 C.F.R. 2.913. 
82 10 C.F.R. 2.905, 2.909. 
83 10 C.F.R. 2.912. 
84 N. above. 
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of the NRC. Strikingly, although oral address to the decisionmaker 
appears to have been an irreducible element of required 
administrative due process from the get-go,85 and characterized the 
Cold War hearings, no court appears yet to have required it in this 
context.86 The facelessness of the DHS redress procedure, 
ultimately decided by the TSC, has not yet been disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
A prize-winning student essay at Columbia Law School87 has 
persuasively chronicled judicial use of the CIPA procedures in 
assessing procedural claims outside the criminal context for which 
they were created. Yet the courts have not made full use of the 
possible analogies. Of the criminal context, recall, the Supreme 
Court remarked in Reynolds that “since the Government which 
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, 
it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then 
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of 
anything which might be material to his defense.”88 Might one not 
equally argue “since the Government which deprives a person of 
liberty or property also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is 
unconscionable to allow it to effect that deprivation and then 
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the person deprived 
of anything which might be material to his defense”? The Cold War 
cases regularly required explicit congressional authorization of 
suspect procedural departures; the no-fly list and its procedures 
have no such authorization. 
The present situation has elicited a range of dark scholarship 
addressing the impact of emergency on liberties and procedures.89 
A colleague has argued in celebrated scholarship that “If we are to 
protect our civil rights and civil liberties against [today’s terrorist] 
threats, the aggressive use of informants, surveillance, wiretaps, 
searches, interrogations, and even group-based profiling must be 
measured not only against the liberties these practices constrict, but 
also with respect to the liberties they may protect… It is simply not 
sufficient to say that augmenting [our usual law enforce-ment] 
practices with laws and practices more appropriate to 
counterterrorism is necessarily inconsistent with protecting our 
civil rights and civil liberties.”90 American courts remain conscious 
of the rights impinged upon by national security concerns and 
                                                
85 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1909) (paper hearing insufficient); Gray Panthers v. 
Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reconsidered after remand, 716 F.2d 23 (D.C.Cir. 
1983) (necessary minimum of oral procedure arguably satisfied by telephonic hearing.) 
86 Thus, the formulation in NCRI relied on in Ralls, n. above, was “We do, however, 
require that the Secretary afford to entities considered for imminent designation the 
opportunity to present, at least in written form, such evidence as those entities may be able 
to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that 
they are foreign terrorist organizations.” 251 F. 3d at 209 (emphasis added).  
87 CIPA Creep, n. above. 
88 345 U.S. at 12. 
89 E.g., Vermeule 
90 Philip Bobbitt, TERROR AND CONSENT – THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
245-46 (2009). 
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willing to offer some protection to them; yet in the contrasts 
between the treatment of procedural claims in the Cold War’s 
emergencies and today’s one may see a regrettable regression. 
